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abstract
The regulation of the merger notification obligation lies at the heart of the sys-
tem of merger control . It defines what transactions are caught under the scru-
tiny of competition authorities, and which undertakings are obliged to notify 
them . The International Competition Network (ICN), which is a virtual net-
work of competition authorities, has developed a series of recommendations for 
the proper construction of a merger notification obligation . The analysis pre-
sented here is limited to substantive provisions and the merger procedure itself 
is not covered by the paper . The article aims to confront the ICN Recommenda-
tions and the Polish regulations . It will identify areas of compatibility and dis-
crepancy between the two sets of norms . The conclusions may serve as a basis for 
further development and the fine-tuning of the Polish merger control system . 
The analysis will also contribute to scholarship on the influence of transgovern-
mental networks on domestic legal order and the administrative practice of pub-
lic authorities .
1 The article forms part of research financed by the National Science Centre, Poland 
in accordance with grant agreement No UMO-2016/23/B/HS5/03605.
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abstrakt
Określenie prawnego obowiązku zgłaszania koncentracji jest kluczowym ele-
mentem systemu kontroli koncentracji . Regulacja ta wskazuje jakie koncen-
tracje podlegają obowiązkowi ich zgłoszenia do organu antymonopolowego 
oraz na jakim przedsiębiorcy ten obowiązek spoczywa . Międzynarodowa Sieć 
Konkurencji (ICN) stanowiąca wirtualną sieć organów konkurencji stworzyła 
serię wytycznych w jaki sposób należy konstruować obowiązek zgłoszenia kon-
centracji w prawie krajowym . Przedmiotem analizy są jedynie regulacje mate-
rialnoprawne, zaś regulacje procesowe pozostają poza przedmiotem analizy . 
Celem artykułu jest porównanie wytycznych ICN z przepisami polskimi . Ziden-
tyfikowane zostaną pola spójności i rozbieżności pomiędzy regulacjami polskimi 
i wytycznymi ICN . 
Wyniki przeprowadzonych badań mogą stanowić dobrą podstawę do dal-
szego rozwoju i doskonalenia polskiego systemu kontroli koncentracji . Prz-
eprowadzona analiza wzbogaci również dotychczasowe badania dotyczące 
wpływu ponadnarodowych sieci organów administracji na krajowy porządek 
prawny i praktykę organów administracji publicznej .
introduction
Merger control aims to prevent anticompetitive concentrations from adversely 
affecting market structure and harm consumers . It is neither possible nor jus-
tifiable to review all mergers . Therefore, when introducing the merger control 
regime, legislators around the world limit the scope of the antimonopoly review 
to only potentially problematic transactions . A properly designed merger obliga-
tion will prevent competition authorities from scrutinising trivial transactions 
and allow them to concentrate their scarce resources on reviewing exclusively 
potentially problematic mergers . The substantive scope of merger review is of 
crucial importance to undertakings, because it may limit or increase transac-
tion costs exponentially . The problem became more evident together with pro-
liferation of merger control regimes, which resulted in the obligation to notify 
the same transaction in multiple jurisdictions2 . It should not be surprising that 
transgovernmental networks of competition authorities began to analyse this 
problem and to address it by adopting recommendations and other soft law 
2 The first comprehensive report capturing this phenomenon was published by the 
OECD. See D. Wood, R. Whish, Merger cases in the real world. A study of merger control proce-
dures, Paris 1994.
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documents concerning the proper regulation of the merger control system, and 
the growing need for international convergence in this area of antitrust .
The aim of this article is to confront recommendations on merger notifica-
tion obligations issued by the largest network of competition authorities, i .e . the 
International Competition Network (ICN), with the relevant Polish provisions . 
The effect of this confrontation will show the possible impact on the domestic 
legal order of the soft law adopted by transgovernmental networks . In addition, 
the results will be relevant for discussions on how networks can ensure that their 
members comply with the soft law rule they together approved . The analysis pro-
vided in the article is limited to substantive issues . Procedural issues are also rel-
evant, but it would require extensive additional research and it would be hardly 
possible to present them within one article3 . The article is structured as follows: 
first, the ICN will be introduced together with a brief presentation of the ICN 
recommendations on the merger notification obligation . It will be followed by 
a concise description of the Polish merger control system and its main devel-
opments in relation to the merger notification obligation . Subsequent sections 
offer a detailed analysis of the Polish merger notification obligation, including 
turnover criteria, substantive criteria and exemptions . The final section shows 
the level of compliance of Polish rules with the ICN recommendations and is fol-
lowed by conclusions .
iCn recommendations in relation to the merger 
notification obligation
The ICN is a virtual and informal network established on October 25, 2005 in 
New York by 14 high representatives of competition authorities4 . The ICN is 
currently the largest network of competition authorities from all over the world 
and is open to any new agency that wishes to join the network5 . The ICN has 
a flexible organisation and is project-oriented . It is led by the Steering Group 
3 The detailed analysis of the Polish merger procedure and its comparison to interna-
tionally recognised standards is provided by M. Błachucki: M. Blachucki, System postępowania 
antymonopolowego w sprawach kontroli koncentracji przedsiębiorców, Warszawa 2012, pp. 114 – 
127; M. Błachucki, Postępowanie antymonopolowe w sprawach koncentracji w świetle aktów 
prawa wtórnego Rady Europy [in:] Kierunki rozwoju prawa administracyjnego, ed. R. Stankie-
wicz, Warszawa 2011, pp. 9–22.
4 The origins of ICN are discussed by Y. Devellennes, G. Kiriazis, The Creation of an 
International Competition Network, ‘Competition Policy Newsletter’ 2002, No. 1, pp. 25–26.
5 It consists of almost 120 jurisdictions bringing together almost all functioning 
national competition authorities. There is only one major exception – the People’s Republic of 
China. However, after the merger of three Chinese competition authorities into one, the like-
lihood of China joining the ICN has increased.
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and most of the work takes place within working groups6 . It fits the practical 
needs of competition agencies who want to develop their expertise in the area of 
competition law . The ICN is open to non-governmental advisors who participate 
in the work of the network . The ICN is an information network that enables 
its network members to share information and exchange their experience in the 
field of competition policy . The network is devoted exclusively to competition 
law and policy covering all crucial areas of antitrust, namely antitrust, unilateral 
conduct, merger control and institutional and policy issues of antitrust enforce-
ment . It organises conferences, workshops and webinars as well as teleconfer-
ences depending on the needs of its members . The ICN is primarily a soft law 
network that has adopted numerous recommendations and best practices, as 
well as handbooks and manuals for the competition community7 . Those docu-
ments are ultimately aimed at the progressive convergence of the administra-
tive practice of national competition authorities and national competition laws . 
The ICN is probably the most successful network of competition authorities and 
constitutes the best solution for the development of international antitrust rules 
and cooperation in the absence of any likelihood of adopting an international 
antitrust treaty8 .
There are three soft law documents of ICN related to the construction of 
the merger notification obligation: 1) ICN Guiding Principles for Merger Noti-
fication and Review9, 2) ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Analysis10, 
and 3) ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Notification and Review Proce-
dures11 . Those documents are of a different character and length, but they are all 
relevant for the analysis of the subject . The second and the third documents are 
accompanied by comments prepared by the ICN Merger Working Group . Those 
6 At present there are five ICN working groups: Advocacy, Agency Effectiveness, Car-
tel, Merger and Unilateral Conduct.
7 The list of the ICN’s soft law documents may be found in ICN Work Products Cata-
logue (June 2016), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc 
1002.pdf (accessed 15/08/18) and Summary of ICN Work Product 2016–2017, http://www.
internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc1100.pdf (accessed 15/08/18).
8 For more analysis on the ICN please refer to The International Competition Network 
At Ten. Origins, Accomplishments and Aspirations, ed. P. Lugard, Cambridge–Antwerp–Portland 
2011. In Polish literature, the ICN is discussed by B. Michalski, Międzynarodowa koordynacja 
polityki konkurencji, Warszawa 2009, pp. 201–230; R. Molski, Prawo antymonopolowe w obliczu 
globalizacji, Bydgoszcz–Szczecin 2007, pp. 72–74; M. Błachucki, System postępowania antymo-
nopolowego w sprawach kontroli koncentracji przedsiębiorców, Warszawa 2012, pp. 81–82.
9 http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc591.pdf 
(accessed 01/08/2018).
10 http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc316.pdf 
(accessed 01/08/2018).
11 http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc1108.pdf 
(accessed 01/08/2018).
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comments are updated periodically and offer more detailed analysis of particular 
standards .
The first document has been historically the first and the most general doc-
ument in the area of merger control . The ICN Guiding Principles for Merger 
Notification and Review is a short set of basic and fundamental guidelines for 
the merger review system . The document expresses the most important prin-
ciple – sovereignty of all jurisdictions . This principle means that all countries 
are free to choose the most appropriate merger control rules for them . However, 
when choosing the merger rules for a particular jurisdiction, the public authori-
ties should follow the third guiding principle – non-discrimination on the basis 
of nationality . Finally the seventh guiding principle calls upon jurisdiction to 
seek the convergence of merger review processes toward agreed best practices .
The second document is devoted to a substantive analysis of notified merg-
ers . However, one of the agreed standards may be also applicable to merger noti-
fication obligation . The principle I .B recommends that ‘a jurisdiction’s merger 
review law and policy should provide a comprehensive framework for effectively 
addressing mergers that are likely to harm competition significantly’ . Com-
ments made by the ICN Merger Working Group underline that merger con-
trol rules should be flexible and enable competition authorities to capture and 
review all problematic merges . Therefore, merger rules should be broad enough 
to cover potentially anticompetitive transactions, regardless of how the transac-
tion is structured . As a result, the power to review a merger should not be based 
on the form or technicalities of a merger agreement . Finally, any exceptions to 
the merger notification obligation should be avoided or limited and narrowly 
drawn, clearly delineated, and reviewed periodically .
The ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Notification and Review Pro-
cedures is the most comprehensive soft law document adopted by the ICN relat-
ing to merger control obligation and merger procedure . First it recommends 
how the concertation for the purpose of merger control should be defined . Juris-
dictions should be careful with this definition and make sure it covers ‘trans-
actions that result in a durable combination of previously independent entities 
or assets and are likely to materially change market structure’ (I .A12) . Further-
more, national legislators should clearly define ‘concentrations’ . The recom-
mended method is by preparing a list of ‘categories of transactions, such as share 
acquisitions and acquisitions of assets’, together with defining crucial concepts, 
‘such as the acquisition of «control» or of a «competitively significant influence», 
as defined by the reviewing jurisdiction’ (I .B) . Secondly, the ICN recommends 
that national legislators limit the obligation to notify mergers only to those 
12 The numbers in brackets indicate the number of specific recommendation from the 
ICN document.
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‘transactions that have a material nexus to the reviewing jurisdiction’ (II .A) . 
In order to establish an adequate material nexus, it should be based on ‘appro- 
priate standards’ (II .B) . Furthermore the nexus of the concentration should only 
be related to ‘activities within that jurisdiction as measured by reference to the 
activities of at least two parties to the transaction in the local territory, and/or 
by reference to the activities of the acquired business in the jurisdiction’ (III .C) . 
The third set of recommendations underline general legislative principles . It is 
crucial that ‘notification thresholds should be clear and understandable’ (II .D) . 
Furthermore, should the national legislator choose the mandatory notification 
system, ‘thresholds should be based on objectively quantifiable criteria’ (II .E) . 
Some of recommendations echo the previously mentioned principles such as the 
need to ‘periodically review their merger control provisions to seek continual 
improvement’ (XIII .A) and the need to promote the convergence of national 
merger control provisions towards recognised best practices (XIII .B) .
This brief recapitulation of the ICN recommendations on the merger noti-
fication obligation shows that the ICN tries to achieve a coherent level playing 
field for merger control systems around the world . The network promotes clear 
and objective rules for the construction of the notification obligation in order 
to facilitate their application and eliminate jurisdictional problems . The inevi-
table consequence of applying the ICN recommendations is a significant reduc-
tion in the number of notifications . It is also clear that the ICN is trying to limit 
the merger control system to purely competition-related principles, which leaves 
any non-competition-related values out of the picture . Such an ambitious goal 
will not always fit into the national legislators’ agenda . Furthermore, in spite of 
the ICN’s absolutist approach to merger control, in the real life merger control 
systems often serve not only competition-related goals . Therefore, some incon-
sistencies between ICN recommendations and national provisions should be 
expected in all jurisdictions .
merger control in poland – overview of the system
The merger control system in Poland is based on the Antimonopoly Act13 and 
two implementing regulations14 . Furthermore, there are two sets of guidelines 
issued by the Polish competition authority: one devoted to jurisdictional and 
13 The Act on Competition and Consumer Protection of February 16, 2007, 
Dz. U. 2018, item 798.
14 Regulation of the Council of Ministers of December 23, 2014 on the notification of 
intended concentration of undertakings, Dz. U. 2018, item 367 and Regulation of the Coun-
cil of Ministers of December 23, 2014 on the calculation of the turnover of undertakings par-
ticipating in the concentration, Dz. U. 2015, item 79.
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procedural aspects of merger control,15 and the other one dealing with substan-
tive merger analysis .16 The case law of Polish courts in relation to merger control 
is very scarce and offers very little if any real guidance . Therefore, the crucial 
role in the development of the Polish merger control system lies in the hands of 
the Polish antimonopoly authority, which is solely responsible for merger con-
trol in Poland17 . The President of the Office for the Competition and Consumer 
Protection (OCCP) is the antimonopoly authority in Poland . The antimonopoly 
authority is a central public administration authority that has two main domains 
of activity: first, ‘traditional’ antitrust matters connected with the protection of 
competition (in the public interest), and the second one connected with the pro-
tection of consumer interests . The antimonopoly authority in Poland is not inde-
pendent and the President of the OCCP has no fixed term of office and may be 
dismissed at any time and for any reason by the Prime Minister . The OCCP has 
exclusive jurisdictional powers and relies completely on an inquisitorial system 
of proceedings . The authority initiates, investigates and decides on merger cases . 
The OCCP has powers to clear a merger, order remedies or prohibit a transac-
tion . Appeals against the rulings of the antimonopoly authority are heard by the 
antimonopoly court18 . Administrative courts play only a subsidiary role in anti-
monopoly adjudications . The OCCP is composed of the central office in Warsaw, 
and nine regional offices . The central office consists of 21 divisions and one of 
them is the Department of Concentration Control . This department deals exclu-
sively with merger control and the regional offices play no role in merger control 
in Poland . This brief introduction shows that merger control in Poland is based 
on a centralised and inquisitorial system, with the antimonopoly authority play-
ing a pivotal role . The basic weaknesses of Polish public enforcement of competi-
tion law are the wide jurisdictional portfolio of the OCCP, which has an adverse 
effect on the competition enforcement ratio, along with the weak position of the 
antimonopoly authority in the Polish public administration system19 .
15 Office for Competition and Consumer Protection – Guidelines on the criteria and 
procedure of notifying the intention of concentration to the President of the OCCP, available 
in Polish at http://uokik.gov.pl/wyjasnienia_i_wytyczne.php.
16 Office for Competition and Consumer Protection – Clarifications concerning the 
assessment by the President of the OCCP of the notified concentrations, available in Polish at 
http://uokik.gov.pl/wyjasnienia_i_wytyczne.php.
17 There are sectoral regulators (for example, the Office for Electronic Communica-
tions, the Financial Supervisory Authority and National Council for Radiophone and Televi-
sion) that may review mergers in parallel to the competition authority but their review is lim-
ited exclusively to regulatory issues.
18 The official name of the antimonopoly court is the Court for Competition and Con-
sumer Protection.
19 For a general overview of Polish competition law, please refer to M. Błachucki, Polish 
Competition Law – Commentary, Case law and Texts, Warsaw 2013.
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To supplement this overview of the institutional and procedural aspects of 
merger control in Poland, a concise picture of substantive merger control provi-
sions will be presented . Under Polish law, the notification obligation is based on 
two sets of criteria . First, it is the type of transaction . Second, the turnover gen-
erated by the parties to the concentration and their capital groups . Both sets of 
criteria must be fulfilled in order to establish an obligation to notify the transi-
tion to the President of the OCCP . The Polish antimonopoly law does not intro-
duce a definition of a concentration, but indicates what kinds of transactions are 
considered to be concentrations . The Polish system of merger control is based on 
the compulsory notification of all transactions meeting the notification criteria . 
Mergers are reviewed through the prism of a significant impediment to effect- 
ive competition (SIEC) test . The supplementary test is the public interest test . 
Jurisdictional issues will be further discussed in detail, but first historical devel-
opments will be discussed . Such an analysis will show what drove those norma-
tive changes, and whether the ICN recommendations have been identified as 
a source of any legislative amendments .
merger obligation – history of polish regulation
The merger control system has been functioning in Poland since 1990 . It was 
introduced by the first modern Antimonopoly Act of 199020 . At first, undertak-
ings were obliged to notify an intention to merge or transform in order to estab-
lish a new company whenever the new undertaking gained a dominant position, 
or if one of the parties to the concentration already enjoyed a dominant position . 
There were no turnover criteria . The antimonopoly authority had two months 
to take a decision . A merger, acquisition or establishment of a new undertaking 
could be implemented if the antimonopoly authority did not oppose it . A signifi-
cant amendment took place in 199521 . The most important change concerned the 
introduction of turnover criteria22 . Three new types of concentrations became 
notifiable – the acquisition of assets, the acquisition of minority sharehold-
ings23 and the same person assuming the function of a director, deputy director, 
20 Act on Counteracting Monopolistic Practices of February 24, 1990, Dz. U. 1990, 
No. 14, item 88.
21 Act of February 3, 1995 amending the Act on Counteracting Monopolistic Practices, 
Dz. U. 1995, No. 41, item 208.
22 It was a combined turnover of ECU 5 mln or ECU 2 mln depending on the type of 
concentration, irrespective of where it was achieved. In bank merger cases, the turnover crite-
rion was set at ECU 50 mln. 
23 Any acquisition or subsequent acquisitions of 10%, 25%, 33% and 50% were notifi-
able. 
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member of the managing or controlling body, member of revision commission 
or position of head accountant of competing undertakings . Those changes have 
been justified by the need to modernise the Polish merger control system and 
made it more effective and to harmonise Polish competition rules with EC stan-
dards24 . In practice, the notification obligation was widened way beyond any rea-
son, which resulted in a geometric increase in the number of notifications . The 
most significant part of notifications concerned the privatisation of previously 
state-owned companies25 . The subsequent amendment resulted from the Act of 
October 22, 1998 amending the Act on Monopolistic Practices26 . The amend-
ment aimed to speed up the merger control process by excluding from the notifi-
cation obligation all mergers of undertakings when their combined turnover did 
not exceed ECU 25 million . Notification was not mandatory in the event that 
the entity acquiring shares in another undertaking resulting in achieving less 
than 10% of votes at a general assembly or assembly of partners .
Since the adoption of the act of 1990, the economic and political situa-
tion of Poland has substantially changed . Hence a new Antimonopoly Act was 
adopted in 200027 . The establishment of a free-market economy and the acces-
sion to the European Union shortly after created an impulse for the adoption 
of a new antimonopoly act . There were several reasons for this act: 1) the sig-
nificant transformation of the Polish economy; 2) the rearrangement of Polish 
legislation after the adoption of the Constitution in 199728; 3) the need for an 
effective legal instrument of competition protection; 4) the harmonisation of 
Polish law with EC standards29 . The Antimonopoly Act of 2000 substantially 
amended the merger control system . The combined turnover was increased up 
to EUR 50 mln, irrespective of where it was achieved . The act of 2000 limited 
the types of transactions when notification was necessary, i .e . in cases of mergers, 
acquisitions and joint-ventures . In addition, notification was also compulsory in 
situations of quasi-concentrations as follows: 1) taking over or acquiring shares 
in another undertaking resulting in achieving at least 25% of votes at a general 
assembly or assembly of partners; 2) the same person assuming the function of 
24 I.B. Nestoruk, Kontrola koncentracji w prawie antymonopolowym – obowiązek zgłoszenia 
zamiaru koncentracji, ‘Przegląd Ustawodawstwa Gospodarczego’ 2008, No. 9, pp. 15–16.
25 P. Lissoń, Kontrola koncentracji gospodarczej w procesach komercjalizacji i prywatyzacji 
przedsiębiorstw państwowych, ‘Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny’ 1998, Issue 2, 
pp. 59–62.
26 Dz. U. 1998, No. 154, item 938.
27 The Act on Competition and Consumer Protection of December 15, 2000, 
Dz. U. 2000, No. 122, item 1319.
28 Constitution of the Republic of Poland of April 2, 1997, Dz. U. 1997, No. 78, item 
483 with further amendments.
29 T. Niedziński, R. Stankiewicz, Kontrola koncentracji przedsiębiorców w ustawie o ochro-
nie konkurencji i konsumentów z 15 grudnia 2000 r., ‘Radca Prawny’ 2003, No. 5, p. 77.
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a member of the managing or controlling body of the competing undertakings; 
3) initiating to exercise the rights arising from the shares taken over or acquired 
without prior notification .
The act of 2000 established several exemptions from the obligation to notify 
the concentration . Firstly, concentrations of insignificant market relevance were 
exempted . This lack of relevance was identified in cases, where: 1) the turnover 
of the acquired undertaking did not exceed the equivalent of EUR 10 million 
in the Republic of Poland, during either of the two accounting years preceding 
the notification; 2) the combined market share of the undertakings intending 
to concentrate does not exceed 20%; 3) a financial institution acquires shares 
on a temporary basis with a view to reselling them . The first exemption was per-
ceived well, although it was hard to find a rational explanation why it is limited 
to certain types of concentration30 . The turnover threshold of EUR 10 million 
was regarded as set at the optimum in the reality of the Polish economy . Nev-
ertheless, a 20% market share in the second exemption was criticised as set at 
too high a level31 . Apart from the mentioned exemptions, there were also three 
more, though of less practical importance . Merger exemptions were amended 
once in 200432 . First, the 20% market share exemption has been repealed . Sec-
ond, the general rule was introduced according to which no merger exemptions 
were applicable provided that that concentration leads to creating or strength-
ening a dominant position .
In 2007, the present Antimonopoly Act was adopted . The official justifica-
tion for passing a completely new competition act was rather limited and weak . 
It was argued that the new Antimonopoly Act is an answer to changing mar-
ket conditions and codifies the administrative practice of the Polish competition 
authority and judicial developments . The major change concerned the turnover 
criteria33 . The act of 2007 kept most of the transactions as types of concentra-
tions and it limited the number of exemptions . Together with the introduction 
of the new Antimonopoly Act, minority shareholding and interlocking direc-
torates were exempted from the notification obligation . They are no longer 
regarded as forms of concentrations . The change was made in order to reduce 
the number of merger notifications and to reduce the transaction costs of under-
takings . Those types of concentrations presented 10% to 15% of all merger cases 
30 Not covering minority shareholding or interlocking directorates which were also 
notifiable at that time.
31 J. Olszewski, Nowa ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów cz. II, ‘Monitor 
Prawniczy’ 2001, No. 15, p. 776.
32 Act of April 16, 2004 amending the Act on Competition and Consumer Protection 
and other acts, Dz. U. 2004, No 41, item 208.
33 Combined domestic turnover of EUR 50 mln and worldwide turnover of EUR 
1 000 mln.
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notified to the antimonopoly authority in the period of 2000–2007 . The obliga-
tion to notify the acquisition of minority shares was perceived as an unnecessary 
burden on undertakings . Several undertakings were fined for a failure to notify 
those types of transactions . Furthermore, the previous experience of the anti-
monopoly authority with controlling minority shareholdings proved that those 
transactions were unproblematic . They are no longer treated as mergers since 
they fall outside the list of merger notifiable transactions34 . Generally, the cur-
rent Antimonopoly Act slightly limited and rationalised the notification obliga-
tion .
The current Antimonopoly Act was amended in 201435 . The new rules limit 
the scope of jurisdiction of the authority by clarifying that all types of transac-
tions where the target company or acquired assets do not exceed EUR 10 mln 
of turnover generated in Poland are exempted from the notification obligation . 
The jurisdiction of the OCCP has been extended in order to capture what are 
known as staggered transactions36 . Those provisions were based on relevant EU 
competition rules37 . Under the previous regulations, it was not clear whether 
such transactions were notifiable . The OCCP ruled in several decisions that par-
ties are obliged to notify such transactions38 . However, the antimonopoly court 
took the opposite opinion39 . Under the new rules, all transactions that take place 
within two years between the same individuals or undertakings consisting of an 
acquisition of undertakings or assets belonging to the same capital group must 
be notified as one concentration . This attempt to capture staggered transactions 
aims to preventing undertakings from avoiding merger scrutiny by artificially 
dividing one transaction into several concentrations . The overall evaluation of 
the amendment is positive, though there are still some concerns regarding the 
wording of the new provisions40 .
34 Under the current regime, minority shareholding and interlocking directorates may 
be only reviewed under the antitrust rules. So far there have not been any cases of this type 
settled by the Polish competition authority.
35 Act of June 10, 2014 on amending the Act on Competition and Consumer Protec-
tion and the Code of Civil Procedure, Dz. U. 2014, item 945.
36 N. Levy, European Merger Control. A Guide to the Merger Regulation, vol. 1, Newark 
2007, p. 5.
37 A. Bielecki, Koncentracje podzielone lub kroczące w unijnym systemie kontroli koncentra-
cji przedsiębiorstw, ‘internetowy Kwartalnik Antymonopolowy i Regulacyjny’ 2018, No. 3(7), 
pp. 24–25.
38 Decisions of the OCCP of February 11, 2004, No. RPZ-2/2004, nyr and of Febru-
ary 11, 2004, No. RWR 7/2004, nyr.
39 Judgments of the Court for Competition and Consumer Protection of March 21, 
2005, XVII Ama 29/04, nyr and of October 5, 2005, XVII Ama 38/04, nyr and judgment of 
the Court of Appeals of April 28, 2008, VI ACa 1288/07, nyr.
40 M. Błachucki, Latest Revision of Polish Competition Law, ‘Österreichische Zeitschrift 
für Kartellrecht’ 2015, No. 1, pp. 25–26.
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merger obligation – turnover thresholds
The general and historical sections showed that the basic criteria in the Pol-
ish merger control system are the turnover ones . These criteria are objective in 
nature – the calculation of turnover is specified in the implementing regulation 
mentioned earlier . It should be noted, however, that the turnover calculated for 
the purpose of these criteria include the turnover of all undertakings engaged in 
concentration, as well as any other undertakings in the capital groups to which 
the undertakings directly taking part in the concentration belong . Pursuant to 
Article 13 (1) of the Antimonopoly Act, a concentration is subject to notifica-
tion if:
1 . the combined worldwide turnover of undertakings participating in the 
concentration in the financial year preceding the year of the notification 
exceeds the equivalent of EUR 1,000,000,000, or
2 . the combined turnover of undertakings participating in the concentra-
tion in the Republic of Poland in the financial year preceding the year of 
the notification exceeds the equivalent of EUR 50,000,000 .
Both criteria are independent of each other and the transaction may fulfil 
just one of them . It is worth underlining that the transaction does not have to 
take place in Poland in order to require notification, as long as the worldwide 
turnover criterion is met . It results in a situation where purely extraterritorial 
transactions fall under the Polish merger notification obligation . This usually 
takes place in cases of foreign joint ventures that are being established far away 
from Poland, for example in the People’s Republic of China .
However, one evident problem is that the turnover values were set in 2000 
and have not been changed since41 . The present value of turnover for the pur-
pose of establishing the notification obligation may not be fully adequate for 
the proper functioning of the Polish merger control system . The arbitrary value 
of EUR 1 000 mln for worldwide turnover may seem adjusted to transnational 
transactions, but the Polish competition authority has never supplied any data 
on how this value was calculated, and why it has not been changed . Further-
more, the last two decades of EUR 50 mln value domestic turnover has proved 
to have become too high for certain transactions of a purely local nature . There 
were several local mergers that escaped the scrutiny of the Polish competition 
authority due to not meeting the domestic turnover criterion, even though they 
seemed problematic42 . This suggests that a significant reform of turnover criteria 
is highly desired .
41 In 2007, the worldwide criterion of EUR 1 000 mln has been introduced.
42 The best example of this would be the merger between the Polish subsidiaries of 
Wolters Kluwer and LexisNexis, which resulted in the creation a dominant position of Wolt-
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merger obligation – substantive thresholds
The second part of the merger notification obligation concerns the type of trans-
actions regarded as concentrations . Unlike in EU law, the Polish Antimonopoly 
Act has not introduced the definition of a concentration . This absence of a gen-
eral definition results in a situation that even temporary market structures need 
to be notified . Nowhere in the Polish competition act is there any indication 
that the concentration ought to be created on a long-lasting basis43 . This leads 
to a situation that even consortia that are set up to develop one-off projects need 
to be notified if they meet transaction-type criteria44 . Pursuant to Art . 13 (2) of 
the Antimonopoly Act, notifiable concentrations covered by the antimonopoly 
act are as follows:
1 . a merger of two or more independent undertakings;
2 . a takeover – by way of acquisition or entering into possession of shares 
or other securities, or in any other way taking direct or indirect control 
over one or more undertakings by one or more undertakings;
3 . the creation by undertakings of one joint undertaking;
4 . the acquisition by the undertaking of a part of another undertaking’s 
property (the entirety or part of the undertaking), if the turnover 
achieved by the property in any of the two financial years preceding the 
notification exceeded the equivalent of EUR 10,000,000 in the Repub-
lic of Poland .
The list of notifiable merger transactions is exclusive and of a jurisdictional 
nature, and under the merger control rules the President of the OCCP may not 
investigate transactions that are not listed in the Antimonopoly Act .
The first type of transaction is not problematic . Two or more previously 
independent undertakings merge into one legal entity combining all their 
assets .45 The second type of transaction may be more burdensome . A takeover 
takes place whenever one undertaking acquires exclusive or shared control over 
other independent undertaking(s) . The crucial concept here is ‘taking over con-
trol’ . It is defined in Art . 4 (4) of the Antimonopoly Act . According to this pro-
vision, ‘taking over control’ means any form of direct or indirect acquisition of 
powers by an undertaking, allowing the undertaking, to exert, individually or 
jointly, taking into account all legal or factual circumstances, a decisive influence 
ers Kluwer on the national market for legal databases. The OCCP initiated explanatory pro-
ceedings but found no grounds to conclude that the lack of notification constituted a violation 
of the notification obligation (Case No DKK2–404/5/14).
43 Judgment of the Court of Appeals of October 13, 2011, VI ACa 381/11, nyr.
44 A good example is the case where two construction companies established a consor-
tium to build a train station (Decision of the OCCP of October 4, 2012, No. DKK 105/2012).
45 S. Gronowski, Polskie prawo antymonopolowe (zarys wykładu), Warsaw 1998, p. 319.
Mateusz Błachucki116
upon another undertaking or other undertakings . Such powers follow in par-
ticular from:
a) holding, directly or indirectly, a majority of votes in the meeting of 
company members or a general shareholders’ meeting, also in the 
capacity of a pledgee or user, or in the management board of another 
undertaking (dependent undertaking), including based on agree-
ments with other persons,
b) the right to appoint or recall a majority of the members of the man-
agement board or supervisory board of another undertaking (depen-
dent undertaking), including based on agreements with other per-
sons,
c) members of the undertaking’s management board or supervisory 
board constituting more than half of the members of another under-
taking’s (dependent undertaking’s) management board,
d) holding directly or indirectly a majority of votes in a dependent part-
nership or in the general meeting of a dependent cooperative, includ-
ing based on agreements with other persons,
e) holding a title to all or part of the property of another undertaking 
(dependent undertaking),
f) a contract that envisages managing another undertaking (dependent 
undertaking), or that undertaking transferring its profits .
The analysed notion of ‘control’ is quite broad, in order to include any 
form of decisive influence over another undertaking based on de iure or de facto 
actions .
In practice, the most problematic in interpretation are cases concerning the 
acquisition of assets, and especially the core concept of ‘assets’ . For the purposes 
of provisions on merger control, assets should be understood as all or part of 
an enterprise of another undertaking . Pursuant to Article 55 (1) of the Civil 
Code, the enterprise is an organised group of intangible and tangible compo-
nents intended for pursuing economic activity, including in particular:
a) a designation individualising the enterprise or its separate parts 
(name of the enterprise),
b) the ownership of immovable or movable property, including equip-
ment, materials, goods and products and any other material rights to 
immovable property or movable property,
c) rights resulting from lease and rent agreements for immovable or 
movable property and the right to use immovable or movable prop-
erty resulting from other legal relations,
d) claims, rights in securities and cash,
e) concessions, licences and permits,
f) patents and other industrial property rights,
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g) copyrights and related property rights,
h) trade secrets,
i) books and documents relating to the economic activity46 .
In a recent decision, the Polish antimonopoly authority found that, under-
takings entering in a long-term lease agreement regarding a petrol station is 
treated as an acquisition of assets47 . This interpretation was supported by the 
courts48 . Similarly, the two-year lease agreement of a chicken farm has been 
treated as a notifiable merger49 .
The creation of a joint venture is the last of the statutory examples of noti-
fiable merger transactions and it is one of the most common, apart from the 
acquisition of control, forms of concentration reviewed by the President of the 
OCCP . The establishment of a joint undertaking usually takes place through the 
establishment of commercial companies (limited liability company, joint stock 
company, general partnership, limited partnership and limited joint-stock part-
nership) and cooperatives . However, it is not required to notify the President 
of the OCCP about undertakings establishing a civil partnership50 . It should 
be stressed that the obligation to notify the intention to concentrate consist-
ing in the establishment of the joint undertaking by undertakings arises only in 
the event when more than one undertaking participates in establishing a joint 
undertaking . Thus, such an obligation does not arise in the situation of estab-
lishing a joint undertaking by just one undertaking, or in the event of establish-
ing a joint undertaking by one undertaking and one or more entities not being 
undertakings . In order for such a concentration to be subject to the notification 
to the President of the OCCP, the process of establishing the joint undertaking 
should therefore involve at least two undertakings51 .
Under Polish law, all kinds of joint venture are notifiable irrespective of 
their concentrative or cooperative character52 . Furthermore, the Polish anti-
monopoly law does not distinguish between joint ventures aimed at long-last-
ing performance of commercial activity and joint ventures created on a tempo-
rary basis . However, the notification obligation may be established only if an 
46 Office for Competition and Consumers Protection – Guidelines on the criteria and 
procedure of notifying the intention of concentration to the President of the OCCP, point 2.5.
47 Decision of the OCCP of December 31, 2014, No. DKK 173/2014, nyr.
48 The judgment of the Court for Competition and Consumer Protection of March 7, 
2016 (XVII AmA 14/15), nyr and the judgment of the Court of Appeals of October 2, 2017 
(VI ACa 715/16), nyr.
49 Decision of the OCCP of September 19, 2017, No. DKK 145/2017, nyr.
50 Office for Competition and Consumers Protection – Guidelines on the criteria and 
procedure of notifying the intention of concentration to the President of the OCCP, point 2.4.
51 Ibid.
52 R. Stankiewicz, Joint ventures w prawie antymonopolowym, ‘Przegląd Prawa Hand-
lowego’ 2007, No. 8, pp. 15–17.
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independent undertaking is created . If the joint venture consists purely of the 
exchange of knowledge or commercial activities without establishing a separate 
undertaking structure it is not regarded as a merger . The antimonopoly act does 
not provide for specific requirements in relation to the joint undertaking (con-
trary to EU regulation 139/2004, where it is required from the joint undertak-
ing to perform the functions of an autonomous economic entity on a permanent 
basis) . The establishment of a joint undertaking that will not perform all the 
functions of an autonomous undertaking on a permanent basis (e .g . products 
manufactured by the joint undertaking will be supplied exclusively or primarily 
to founding undertakings or capital groups to which founders belong), should 
also be notified to the President of the OCCP53 .
Last but not least, it should be mentioned that the Polish competition 
authority treats transactions as joint ventures when, in order to create a joint 
undertaking, one of participants establishes a new company and then the other 
participants purchase or take up its shares . Moreover, the OCCP treats transac-
tions the same way when, in order to establish the joint undertaking, partici-
pants of a concentration use an existing undertaking . In practice, it is very dif-
ficult to distinguish between the creation of a joint venture on the basis of an 
existing undertaking and the acquisition of joint control over an undertaking54 . 
The source of the problem is that there are different rules on the calculation of 
the turnover depending on the type of transaction . When establishing a joint 
venture, the combined turnover of all capital groups that create the joint venture 
is included, but when it is an acquisition of joint control it is the turnover of the 
active capital group and the turnover of the acquired company (not the entire 
capital group to which it belongs) that is included . It results in a situation when, 
depending on the interpretation of the particular transaction, the obligation to 
notify the merger may arise or not . This creates significant legal uncertainty for 
undertakings .
merger obligation – exemptions
Notification criteria are based on formal premises and derived from substantive 
factors . Therefore there is a need to relax these formal premises by introducing 
exemptions . Those exemptions aim to eliminate from scrutiny any transactions 
53 Office for Competition and Consumer Protection – Guidelines on the criteria and 
procedure of notifying the intention of concentration to the President of the OCCP, point 2.4.
54 J. Lenart, T. Kaczyńska, Kiedy utworzenie nowej spółki nie będzie kwalifikowane jako 
utworzenie nowego przedsiębiorcy (joint venture)? Praktyczne rozważania dotyczące problematyki 
joint venture w polskim prawie konkurencji, ‘internetowy Kwartalnik Antymonopolowy i Regu-
lacyjny’ 2016, No. 1 (5), pp. 43–16.
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that are insignificant or, by their nature it is unlikely that they may cause any 
competitive problems . Article 14 of the Antimonopoly Act indicates that the 
obligation to notify the intention to concentrate does not apply where:
1 . the turnover of the undertaking over which control is to be taken in 
accordance with Article 13 (2) did not exceed the equivalent of EUR 
10,000,000 in the Republic of Poland in any of the two financial years 
preceding the notification;
2 . a financial institution whose normal activities include investing in 
shares in other undertakings, for its own account or for the account of 
others, which acquires or takes over shares, on a temporary basis, with 
a view to reselling them, provided that the resale takes place within one 
year from the date of the acquisition or take over, and that:
a) this institution does not exercise the rights arising from these shares, 
except for the right to a dividend, or
b) exercises these rights solely in order to prepare for the resale of the 
entirety or part of the undertaking, its assets, or these shares;
3 . the undertaking acquires or takes over shares, on a temporary basis, with 
a view to securing debts, provided that the undertaking does not exer-
cise the rights arising from these shares, except for the right to sell;
4 . the concentration arises as an effect of insolvency proceedings, exclud-
ing the cases where the control is to be taken over by a competitor or 
a participant of the capital group to which the competitors of the target 
undertaking belong;
5 . the concentration applies to undertakings participating in the same cap-
ital group .
All the exceptions are of an absolute character . If a transaction fulfils any 
of premises set out in Article 14, it is exempted from the scrutiny of the antimo-
nopoly authority, even if it is or may be anticompetitive . The most important is 
the first exemption . Together with special rules on calculating the turnover, it 
constitutes the most frequent situation when undertakings are exempted from 
the obligation to notify the merger . When interpreting the fourth exemption, 
it should be remembered that it applies only to insolvency proceedings taking 
place in Poland and conducted according to Polish provisions . Interestingly, the 
competitors are excluded from enjoying this exemption . It is also worth noting 
that all types of transactions are covered by this exemption55 .
55 Under the previous rules, the acquisition of assets were not covered by this exemp-
tion. A. Adamczyk, Obowiązek zgłoszenia do UOKiK zamiaru koncentracji w postępowaniu 
upadłościowym, ‘Przegląd Prawa Handlowego’ 2010, No. 5, p. 24.
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Compatibility and discrepancy between the iCn 
recommendations and the polish regulation
An analysis of Polish provisions on the merger notification obligation through 
the prism of the ICN recommendations shows that they are compatible only to 
a certain extent . Polish provisions are surely an expression of the sovereignty 
of Polish legislator, who constructs the merger notification autonomously and 
so the scope of the obligation differs (to some extent) from other jurisdictions 
(including EU competition rules) . Similarly, Polish provisions provide for a very 
wide scope of the merger notification obligation . As a result, the Antimonopoly 
Act provides for a very wide scope of merger notification obligation . It applies to 
a variety of transactions, including extraterritorial ones . Merger thresholds are 
objective, i .e . turnover and type of transaction . The previously applicable domi-
nance threshold has been eliminated in the current Antimonopoly Act . The cal-
culation of turnover has improved immensely through the years . In particular, 
it is clear now that in the case of acquiring assets or taking over another under-
taking, the turnover of the selling group that is not being transferred to the 
acquiring party is not to be considered when applying the merger notification 
thresholds . The exhaustive list of notifiable transactions includes only typical 
transactions and quasi-concentrations, such as the acquisition of minority share-
holdings or interlocking directorates, are no longer covered by the merger noti-
fication obligation . Furthermore, the list of exemptions properly excludes from 
the merger scrutiny those transactions that are likely to be unproblematic, like 
internal group restructuring . To improve the clarity and general understanding 
of the merger notification obligation provisions, and to increase legal certainty 
of undertakings, the OCCP has adopted jurisdictional, procedural and analytical 
guidelines . In principle, it is a good practice recommended by the ICN, the other 
issue is the quality of these guidelines .
The core regulation of the merger notification obligation is in line with ICN 
recommendations, but there are also visible discrepancies between the Polish 
provisions and the ICN recommendations . First some general observations will 
be presented . There is no doubt that Polish provisions are far from being clear 
and precise56 . That deprives undertakings on many occasions from legal cer-
tainty when planning their transactions . What is even more troublesome is that 
the lack of legal certainty is often a result of guidelines prepared by the OCCP, 
and not the Antimonopoly Act itself . Furthermore, the merger thresholds do not 
56 R. Stankiewicz, Dysfunkcjonalność niektórych norm prawa antymonopolowego przewi-
dujących obowiązek zgłoszenia zamiaru koncentracji przedsiębiorców (uwagi na tle prawa unij-
nego) [in:] Dysfunkcje publicznego prawa gospodarczego, eds. M. Zdyb, E. Kruk, G. Lubeńczuk, 
Warszawa 2018, p. 274.
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go through any sort of periodical review and adjustment to a changing economic 
environment57 . The turnover thresholds have not been updated for almost two 
decades . During this period, the Antimonopoly Act has been amended on sev-
eral occasions, and some of those changes concerned merger control provisions . 
This clearly proves that neither the OCCP nor the Polish legislator express any 
willingness to analyse the adequacy of turnover thresholds or the proper design 
of the concentration definition, together with the types of notifiable transac-
tions . This highlights the problem of improperly designed turnover thresholds .
At present, many transactions do not have any material nexus to the Pol-
ish jurisdiction . This is due to the existence of the worldwide turnover criterion . 
This turnover concerns mostly sales generated outside of Poland, and has no rel-
evance to the situation on the Polish market . It is unclear why this threshold was 
introduced, or why it is still in force . At the same time, some transactions escape 
the scrutiny of the Polish competition authority because the domestic thresholds 
are set at too high a level . There is also a significant problem resulting from the 
lack of any definition of concentration . Hence there is an absence of require-
ment that concentrations should result in a durable combination of previously 
independent entities or assets . As a result, many temporary transactions are 
covered by the obligation to notify . Furthermore, even though the list of types 
of notifiable transactions provided by the Antimonopoly Act clearly identifies 
what are the types of notifiable agreements, the official interpretation offered 
by the OCCP leads to significant problems in identifying types of transactions 
and creates a dilemma as to whether they are notifiable or not . At the same time, 
the jurisdictional guidelines were updated only once, when significant changes 
to the merger procedure were implemented . Finally, the OCCP has failed to reg-
ularly update the guidelines, despite the many developments that have taken 
place since they were adopted i .e . 2009, which are not included in the guide-
lines . Such an update would be required in relation to the most confusing types 
of mergers, i .e . the acquisition of assets and joint ventures .
The identified areas of discrepancies should be a starting point for a dis-
cussion on future amendments to the Polish merger control system . Such dis-
cussions should be as comprehensive as possible and include not only the ICN 
recommendations, but OECD recommendations as well, together with views of 
Polish academics, practitioners and undertakings . The ICN recommendations 
constitute a proposal for a change and the OCCP should thoroughly analyse 
them before presenting well-reasoned proposals . Ignoring the ICN or OECD 
proposals, not to mention opinions from Polish academics and practitioners, 
is a long and controversial practice of the Polish competition authority and the 
57 S. Dudzik, Kontrola koncentracji w świetle ostatnich zmian ustawowych, ‘internetowy 
Kwartalnik Antymonopolowy i Regulacyjny’ 2015, No. 2(4), pp. 40–41.
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Polish legislator (which was shown in the historical section) . Such conclusions 
should not be understood as full support for complete compliance of the Polish 
merger control provisions with the ICN recommendations58 . I argue for making 
a conscious decision by the Polish legislator on the future amendment of the Pol-
ish merger control system and taking into consideration all possible experience 
and opinions .
iCn dilemma – how to make recommendations effective?
The ICN is a virtual and informal transgovernmental network of competi-
tion authorities . It is an information network that primarily relies on soft law 
documents adopted by the ICN . However, the visible and impressive achieve-
ments of the ICN in the area of adopting recommendations and best practices 
are mirrored by equally visible inconsistencies between the ICN recommenda-
tions and national merger provisions of its members . Studies have been under-
taken exploring reasons explaining why network members decide not to follow 
network recommendations59 . There might be objective and subjective reasons 
behind these discrepancies, and some of them are independent of competition 
agencies involved in the works on the ICN . Even though no one expects full com-
pliance of all jurisdictions with the ICN recommendations, the level of incon-
sistencies remain significant . It was supported by the ICN study on the com-
pliance of member jurisdictions with merger recommendations60 . The results of 
this study were not very optimistic . The conclusions of this study pointed out 
that ‘a clear majority of jurisdictions have not yet made implementation a prior-
ity and it is clear that achieving implementation will be a significant challenge, 
notwithstanding the consensus and momentum arising from their develop-
ment and adoption’61. The next ICN survey also identified similar inconsisten-
cies, but it concluded that the situation has improved and that there have been 
58 I believe that the OCCP should construct Polish merger control provisions so as they 
create an optimal scrutiny system. Particular provisions may remain contrary to the ICN rec-
ommendations. For example, I have argued elsewhere that I strongly believe the market share 
threshold served its purpose in the Polish merger control system and so should be reinstated. 
See M. Błachucki, System postępowania antymonopolowego w sprawach kontroli koncentracji 
przedsiębiorców, Warszawa 2012. 
59 S.J. Evenett, A. Hijzen, Conformity with International Recommendations on Merger 
Reviews. An Economic Perspective on ‘Soft Law’, ‘University of Nottingham, Research Paper’ 
2006, No. 4, pp. 30–39.
60 J.W. Rowley QC, A.N. Campbell, Implementation of the International Competition Net-
work’s Recommended Practices for Merger Review. Final Survey Report on Practices IV-VII, ‘World 
Competition’ 2005, vol. 28(4), pp. 533–588.
61 Ibid., p. 559.
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‘a tiny fraction of agencies who have made changes that do not conform to the 
Recommended Practices, and no agency has engaged in reforms that change an 
ICN-compliant regime to a non-compliant one’62. Those surveys show that ICN 
is aware of its Achilles heel, i .e . the insufficient level of implementing the net-
work’s recommendations .
There are a number of ways in which the ICN may encourage greater con-
vergence among its members . The ICN may call for greater involvement of non-
governmental advisors who may indicate deficiencies of the national merger 
control systems . Furthermore, the network may engage in direct contact with 
particular agencies assisting them in the development of national merger con-
trol rules . The ICN may push for changes that may be directly implemented by 
agencies themselves without the involvement of the national legislator or gov-
ernment . The network may also take a step-by-step approach, meaning that it 
should encourage its members to comply with more general recommendations 
before gradually passing on to more detailed ones . Last but not least, the ICN 
may begin conducting peer reviews of particular countries on a voluntary basis . 
When advocating for a more active approach from the ICN to the implemen-
tation of the network’s recommendations, one should be aware that it may 
adversely affect the willingness of particular jurisdictions to engage in works of 
the ICN . The success of the ICN lies within its informality, elasticity and the lack 
of enforcement powers . Therefore different levels of implementation of particu-
lar recommendations by national jurisdictions may be directly connected to the 
nature of this transgovernmental network .
Even though many jurisdictions have problems with the implementation of 
the ICN recommendations, it should not be treated as an excuse for the OCCP 
to ignore the network’s soft law . Should the Polish antimonopoly authority 
decide to deviate from previously agreed best practices, such a decision ought 
to be made consciously and after careful consideration of international recom-
mendations . In addition, in recent years the Polish antimonopoly authority has 
presented a rather passive attitude towards the ICN, which has been reflected by 
a low level of participation in the network’s activities . Therefore, a more active 
approach is advisable . Officials from the OCCP should more eagerly engage in 
particular working groups of the ICN, which should correspond to the particular 
needs of the Polish competition authority . The greater involvement of the OCCP 
in the works of the ICN will lead to a greater chance of achieving a cognitive 
62 M. Coppola, C. Lagdameo, Taking Stock and Taking Root. A Closer Look at Imple-
mentation of the ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Notification & Review Procedures [in:] 
The International Competition Network At Ten. Origins, Accomplishments and Aspirations, ed. 
P. Lugard, Cambridge–Antwerp–Portland 2011, p. 315.
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convergence among all cooperating officials63 . Such a cognitive convergence is 
often a prerequisite for the administrative convergence of practices of national 
competition authorities . The last stage of this convergence process is likely the 
harmonisation of hard law national rules . Last but not least, the greater the par-
ticipation of the OCCP officials in the works of the ICN, the greater is the chance 
for the development of daily international administrative cooperation between 
national competition authorities from different jurisdictions .
Conclusions
The merger notification obligation plays a crucial role in the optimal con-
struction of a merger control system . The ICN recommendations may serve as 
an important source of assistance for national authorities when designing rel-
evant national provisions . The Polish legislator is very reluctant to admit any 
foreign influence over legislative changes . The only exception is the influence 
of the ‘acquis communitaire’ . The OCCP has never officially acknowledged the 
influence of the ICN recommendations on Polish legislation or administrative 
practice . This is especially surprising, given how many of the Polish competi-
tion authority’s resources have been invested in the Polish competition author-
ity participating in the network (including organising the annual conference) . 
What is even more worrying is that the OCCP has never expressed any desire 
in pursuing convergence to the best practices and international standards of 
merger control (the OCCP similarly ignores the recommendations and conclu-
sions from peer reviews undertaken by the OECD64) . Despite this official denial 
of the ICN’s influence, it is possible to speculate on the informal influence 
that has shaped Polish merger provisions . When analysing the history of Pol-
ish merger rules, there is a visible tendency towards greater conformity of those 
rules with the ICN recommendations . This tendency may suggest that participa-
tion in the work of the ICN has indeed stimulated Polish officials and resulted in 
altering their administrative practice, ultimately encouraging the amendment of 
Polish merger control provisions . On the other hand, the absence of any official 
recognition of external influence from the ICN may be driven by political con-
siderations . Furthermore, there may also be a practical side to such a policy . By 
officially ignoring the influence of the ICN recommendations, the OCCP does 
not need to explain why there are so many discrepancies between them and the 
63 D.K. Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in Global Competition Policy, ‘The American 
Journal of International Law’ 2000, vol. 94, No. 3, pp. 479, 495.
64 M. Błachucki, The role of the OECD in development and enforcement of competition 
law, ‘e-Pública – Revista Eletrónica de Direito Público’ 2016, vol. 3, No. 3, p. 190.
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Polish provisions . This may provoke a relevant question though – why does the 
Polish competition authority support the adoption of recommendations by the 
ICN, while simultaneously refusing to follow them? The answer to this question 
would require more of a political analysis rather than a legal one .
It is worth emphasising that identifying possible inconsistencies between 
the Polish provisions and the ICN recommendations is not a purely academic 
exercise . It would be naïve to assume that all jurisdictions will be totally in line 
with international standards, since any provision must fit into the national legal 
system and reflect the political choice of the national sovereign . Therefore, one 
should not a priori exclude the possibility that there might be a good justifica-
tion why Poland’s merger provisions do not comply with international stan-
dards, though neither the OCCP nor the Polish legislator have ever presented 
any . What is even more important is that the identified discrepancies between 
the ICN recommendations and the Polish merger provisions are also indicated 
by Polish academics and practitioners as problematic and defective . This is a clear 
sign that there should be a comprehensive amendment of the merger control sys-
tem in Poland . It also supports the view that international standards may be ben-
eficial for the design of national provisions, where they are based on the shared 
experience of various jurisdictions from all over the world . The ICN delivers 
such standards, but it lacks any powers to enforce them . Nonetheless, the ICN 
should invest more resources in monitoring compliance with the adopted rec-
ommendations and continue to place persuasive pressure on national jurisdic-
tions for greater convergence . The last word will still be with national legisla-
tors, who may choose to retain full sovereignty over inefficient national merger 
control systems, but the cost of this choice will then be incurred by undertakings 
and consumers .
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Mateusz Błachucki128
SUMMARY
The article presents the Polish regulation on the merger notification obligation 
in the context of the ICN Recommendations . The analysis is limited to substan-
tive provisions and the merger procedure is not covered . The article aims to 
identify the extent to which the Polish provisions comply with internationally 
recognised recommendations . First it introduces the International Competition 
Network and its soft law documents related to the merger notification obliga-
tion . The next part describes the Polish system merger control, i .e . basic con-
cepts and relevant historical developments . This is followed by a detailed analy-
sis of the substantive regulation of the obligation . The article discusses turnover 
criteria, substantive criteria and exemptions to the notification obligation . It is 
then confronted with the ICN Recommendations . The comparison proves that 
the Polish merger obligation regulation has developed independently of the ICN 
Recommendations, and that there are visible discrepancies between the Polish 
provisions and the ICN soft law . It is argued that several amendments to the Pol-
ish provisions are needed . The ICN Recommendations may assist in this process, 
but most importantly it should address the real needs of the effectiveness of the 
Polish system of merger control . The article highlights that the ICN lacks an 
effective system of compliance scrutiny, and that this may undermine the overall 
achievements of the network . It is suggested that peer review should be imple-
mented and that the broader engagement of OCCP officials in the works of the 
ICN and other transgovernmental networks is required .
keywords
competition law, merger control, International Competition Network, soft law, 
recommendations, Polish law
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STRESZCZENIE
spójność polskiego prawa konkurencji z wytycznymi międzynarodowej 
sieci konkurencji – na przykładzie przepisów o obowiązku zgłaszania 
zamiaru koncentracji przedsiębiorców
Artykuł omawia polskie przepisy ustanawiające obowiązek notyfikacji koncen-
tracji Prezesowi UOKiK, konfrontując je z rekomendacjami ICN dotyczącymi 
tego zagadnienia . Przedmiotem badania są wyłącznie regulacje materilano-
-prawne z pominięciem analizy procedury antymonopolowej w zakresie kontroli 
koncentracji . Celem badań jest zidentyfikowanie w jakim zakresie Polskie prze-
pisy są zgodne z międzynarodowymi standardami . 
Na wstępie omówiono ICN i zaprezentowano dorobek sieci w zakresie 
regulacji obowiązku notyfikacji koncentracji . W kolejnej części przedstawiono 
podstawowe cechy polskiego systemu kontroli koncentracji oraz najważniejsze 
historyczne zmiany tych regulacji . Następnie przeprowadzona została szczegó-
łowa analiza elementów konstrukcyjnych obowiązku notyfikacyjnego, obejmu-
jąca: kryteria obrotowe, kryteria transakcyjne oraz wyłączenia spod obowiązku 
notyfikacyjnego . Analiza porównawcza wytycznych ICN i polskich przepisów 
odnoszących się do obowiązku notyfikacyjnego ujawniła obszary widocznych 
niezgodności . Może ona stanowić punkt wyjścia do ewentualnych zmian pol-
skiego prawa konkurencji . Jednocześnie, choć wytyczne ICN mogą być jedną 
z inspiracji zmian, to ewentualna nowelizacja ustawy antymonopolowej powinna 
też uwzględniać niedoskonałości wykryte w procesie stosowania ustawy . 
W artykule podkreślono, że ICN nie ma skutecznego mechanizmu zachę-
cania swoich członków do konwergencji ich przepisów krajowych, co w dłuższej 
perspektywie może podważać istotność jej dorobku . Z tego względu sformu-
owano postulat wprowadzania mechanizmu przeglądów partnerskich w działal-
ności ICN oraz zwiększenia zaangażowania przedstawicieli UOKiK w pracach 
sieci .
słowa kluczowe
prawo konkurencji, kontrola koncentracji, Międzynarodowa Sieć Konkurencji, 
prawo miękkie, wytyczne, prawo polskie
